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court."15 Nevertheless, by analogy, GPLR 2212(a) should be utilized
by the civil court in those instances where motion practice in the
supreme court would warrant its application. The jurisdictional justification is present; a literal interpretation of CPLR 2212(a) should
not be employed to prevent its adoption in the New York City Civil
Court.
ARTICLE 31 -DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(a): Courts continue to grant liberal disclosure of witnesses' names.
Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, the names of witnesses
were rarely the proper subject of disclosure." 6 Nevertheless, various
exceptions to this stringent approach arose."17 In recognition of the
logic underlying these exceptions, CPLR 3101(a), as originally proposed," 18 emulated the "relevancy" standard utilized in the federal
courts."19 Although rejected legislatively, the federal standard was
gradually adopted by the judiciary. This liberal construction of the
disclosure article was ultimately sanctioned by the New York Court
20
of Appeals' decision in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.1
where "material
and necessary" was virtually interpreted to mean
"relevant."' 2' In short, the trend is now clearly toward an interpreta22
tion of CPLR 3101 providing for prolific disclosure.
Continuing this trend, the New York City Civil Court, in Beyer
v. New York Telephone Co.,

23

recently permitted disclosure of the

identity of a witness who, though not present at the time of the accident, arrived five to ten minutes thereafter and drove the plaintiff
home. The witness was deemed to be so closely related to the occur115 Discretion permits the "motion court" to transfer the motion to the trial court
in a supreme court action. See Baker, Voorhis & Co. v. Heckman, 28 App. Div. 2d 673,
280 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1967); 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 2212, supp. commentary 14
(1969).
116

Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 620, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (Sup. Ct. Queens

County 1969). See The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 140 (1969).

117 For example, in Pistana v. Pangborn, 2 App. Div. 2d 643, 151 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d
Dep't 1956), disclosure was permitted on the theory that the witness was an "active participant" in the events upon which plaintiff relied.
118 See Fi~sT REP. 117.

119 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b): "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...
including ... the identity ... of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." (Emphasis
added.) See also 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.19, at 124142 (2d ed. 1968).

12021 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968). See also The Quarterly

Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 324 (1968).
121 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 11 (1970).

3101.11.
122 See 3 W. K. & M.
123 61 Misc. 2d 222, 305 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1969).
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rence that his testimony was material, necessary, and possibly essential
in aiding the parties in the preparation of their case. 124 Although the
decision is one of first impression, 12 5 the reasoning is undeniably
sound.
Previous cases dealing with disclosure of witnesses' names spoke
only of those "present at the scene, who saw the accident,'1 26 or "who
were right there,"' 2 7 or who were "present at the time of the accident"
and were witnesses "of the event itself."'12 8 However, one notable authority analyzed the implications of these holdings and forecast that
these phrases "can reasonably be regarded as embracing all of those
who witnessed at first hand any element that reflects on the liability
issue in the case."' 29 As evidenced by the decision, Judge Boyers obviously concurs in this analysis. Moreover, federal practice would
undoubtedly sanction the result reached.13 0 Beyer is therefore a welcome addition to the other recent decisions which strive to make the
test for disclosure one of usefulness and reason.' 13
ARTICLE 32 -

ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

Collateral Estoppel: Texas judgment against common carrier given
collateral estoppel effect in subsequent action brought by other plaintiffs in New York.
Although it is now well established in New York that a party
need not be given a day in court against a particularlitigant 3 2 provided that there is an "identity of issue which has necessarily been
124 Id.

at 223, 305 N.YS.2d at 267.

See Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion at 2, Beyer v. New York Tel.
Co., 61 Misc. 2d 222, 305 N.YS.2d 265 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1969).
126 Sanfilipo v. Baptist Temple, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 767, 768, 276 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1967).
127 Newton v. Board of Educ., 52 Misc. 2d 259, 262, 275 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1966).
128 Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 414, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823 (1st Dep't
125

1964).

129 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3101, commentary 46-47 (1970). Accordingly, Professor
Siegel would include among those whose identity is disclosable the "bartender or drink-

ing companion who saw the party drunk" prior to the accident and "the witness around
the comer or a few blocks away who did not see the accident but saw one of the parties
driving out of control or at a high speed." Id. at 46.
130 For example, in Cannaday v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 19 F.R.D. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
interrogatories were permitted not only as to names and addresses of persons witnessing
the accident, but also as to persons otherwise having knowledge of the circumstances of
the accident, of plaintiff's injuries, and of the equipment used on the ship where the
accident occurred.
131 See, e.g., Peretz v. Blekicki, 31 App. Div. 2d 934, 298 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't
1969); Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
132See Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1

(1956).

